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CORPORATE CRIMMIGRATION
Brandon L. Garrett*
Immigration laws are not just criminally enforced against individuals,
but also corporations. For individuals, “crimmigration” is pervasive, as
federal immigration prosecutions are a mass phenomenon. More than a
third of the federal criminal docket—nearly 40,000 cases each year—consists of prosecutions of persons charged with violations of immigration
rules. In contrast, prosecutors rarely charge corporations, which are required to verify citizenship status of employees. This Article sheds light on
this unexplored area of corporate criminal law, including by presenting
new empirical data. In the early 2000s, corporate immigration enforcement
for the first time increased in prominence. During the Obama Administration, this trend accelerated, with a total of 101 corporate immigration prosecutions brought, and record penalties imposed. Under the Trump Administration so far, however, there have been just seven corporate immigration
prosecutions, and the only large cases have been legacy matters from the
prior Administration. This Article does not suggest that workplace immigration screening and enforcement, much less criminal enforcement, is desirable. Instead, this Article explores how corporate charging dynamics
may exacerbate tensions inherent in criminalizing immigration in the workplace. This Article contrasts the mass prosecution of individuals, under
strict zero-tolerance rules, with the leniency-oriented approach towards
firms that carefully considers collateral consequences, to shed light on internally conflicted federal policy at the intersection of corporate and immigration law. Now that the federal criminal dockets have become dominated
by immigration enforcement, the problem of “corporate crimmigration”
deserves more urgent attention.

* L. Neil Williams Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to Kerry Abrams,
Sam Buell, Kate Evans, and Eisha Jain for conversations about this project and invaluable comments on earlier
drafts. I thank Emma Roberts for excellent research assistance. I am grateful to Jon Ashley for his longtime
collaboration in creating and maintaining the Duke & University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution Registry that
maintains these data as a research repository.
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INTRODUCTION

Immigration and criminal enforcement are increasingly interconnected. In
the past, immigration violations were treated as civil matters, without any criminal component.1 Today, in the United States, “crimmigration” is the new normal: more than a third of the federal docket now consists of prosecutions of
noncitizens who violated immigration rules, largely for unlawful entry and
reentry.2 Immigration now consistitutes the largest category in the federal criminal docket.3 In 2018, federal immigration arrests of noncitizens almost doubled,
increasing by a massive 50,000 people, to 108,000 arrests.4 Immigration prosecutions increased 650% from 1998–2018, from about 13,000 to almost 100,000
federal immigration prosecutions each year.5 There may be at any time, upwards
of 50,000 noncitizens in federal custody at any given time, which constitute about

1. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137
(2009).
2. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 N W. U. L. R EV . 1281, 1281–82, 1352 fig.4
(2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th
“Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. I NT 'L L. & COM. R EGUL. 639, 655 (2004); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That
Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L.
R EV . 1819, 1858 (2011). See generally, Chacón, supra note 1, at 135, 137–43.
3. Eagly, supra note 2, at 1281–82; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2019/FY18_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/69WR-9TT5].
4. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND
THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1998–2018 2, 4, tbl.1 (2019); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 5, 7.
5. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at tbl.16. The increase was driven by a surge in illegal reentry charges, in the
five federal districts along the U.S. Mexico Border. Id. at 1–2.
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43% of the federal prison population.6 The scale of criminal enforcement against
individuals occurs on a mass scale, although the criminal penalties themselves
are typically small.7
Corporate crimmigration, as I describe in this Article, or the federal enforcement of immigration crime against corporations, is a study in contrasts, as
compared with criminal immigration enforcement against individuals.8 This Article is the first to explore the phenomenon empirically, by presenting original
data concerning corporate immigration prosecution in the United States.9 As detailed in this Article, and in the Appendix, corporate immigration prosecutions,
while long uncommon, steadily increased in number until recently, when they
noticeably declined.10 During the Obama Administration, corporate immigration
enforcement notably increased, building on an early focus on corporate enforcement in the George W. Bush Administration. Prosecutors brought a total of 101
corporate immigration prosecutions from 2008 through 2016, and cases imposed
large financial penalties and requirements that corporations adopt compliance in
hiring practices.11 Under the Trump Administration, there have so far been just
seven corporate immigration prosecutions, with the only large corporate case
concluding as a legacy matter brought several years earlier by the prior Administration.12
Corporate crimmigration raises very different policy concerns than corporate criminal law more generally, although there are common themes. In the area
6. ERO FY 2019 Achievements, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/
features/ERO-2019 [https://perma.cc/S9FN-UZ39] (“ERO’s Average Daily Population in custody reached
50,165 in FY 2019, an increase of 19% compared to FY 2018. At times, ERO’s detention population exceeded
56,000.”); see also Emma Kaufman, Segregation by Citizenship, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1380–87 (2019) (describing the rise in segregated immigration prisons).
7. Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1968, 1974–
91 (2020) (describing the Trump Administration focus on border enforcement, from which three notable policies
emerged: a zero-tolerance stance for illegal entry, enhanced punishment for those who reenter after deportation,
and forced separation of children from parents being prosecuted).
8. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367, 376 (2006) (“Immigration law today is clothed with so many attributes of criminal law that the line between
them has grown indistinct. Scholars have labeled this the ‘criminalization of immigration law.’”). The vast majority of these prosecutions, as discussed further in Part I, are for illegal reentry, and not for worksite violations.
See MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 22 tbl.18.
9. Preliminary findings were shared with the Washington Post and reported in August 2019. Renae Merle,
As Workplace Raids Multiply, Trump Administration Charges Few Companies, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2019,
4:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/09/workplace-raids-multiply-trump-administration-charges-few-companies/ [https://perma.cc/58ZL-TNXW] (“Prosecuting corporations, as opposed to individual workers or managers, for immigration-related offenses was also relatively rare during the Obama administration, but it has slowed further under the Trump administration, according to a database maintained by Duke
University and the University of Virginia and data reviewed by The Washington Post.”).
10. Indeed, the same Bureau of Justice Statistics Report, describing the “Federal criminal justice response”
to immigration, does not mention workplace violations or prosecutions against corporations in its data or lists of
offenses, instead focusing on the far more often prosecuted reentry, illegal entry, visa, and alien smuggling offenses. See MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 23.
11. See APPENDIX: FEDERAL CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS, 2001–2019 (listing these cases).
12. See id.; see also Merle, supra note 9 (“The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse
University examined federal data for a one-year period—April 2018 through March 2019—and found that no
companies were prosecuted for knowingly hiring undocumented workers.”).
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of financial or white-collar corporate crime, for many years, critics raised concerns that the justice system has allowed serious corporate crimes to go unpunished as prosecutors offered, after the Enron-era scandals, deferred or nonprosecution agreements to corporations.13 I have described the practical challenges
when prosecuting “too big to jail” corporations in a variety of contexts, including
the challenges when charging corporate employees and managers.14 While the
concern with regulating the financial system is not a common thread, there is a
shared concern regarding individual accountability as compared with corporate
compliance with the law, and a common theme regarding relatively more privileged and less privileged actors in the economy. For large corporations, access
to highly educated “specialty” workers through programs, such as the H-1B program, is legal and has been relatively secure, despite recent changes to immigration policies.15 In contrast, immigrant workers in less high-paying jobs, such as
in agriculture, construction, or food processing, may face immigration enforcement, deportation, and criminal prosecution. Relatedly, in immigration law, the
disconnect between corporate and individual enforcement is stark. Massive numbers of individuals are prosecuted, and detained prior to deportation, under nondiscretionary “zero-tolerance” policies operating at the U.S.-Mexico border.16
The chances that an individual will be subject to immigration enforcement in a
workplace setting outside of the border setting is low.17 Instead, it is a criminal
arrest, even for routine traffic enforcement, that may trigger immigration screening; however, for that reason, even apart from employment screening, individuals may have strong reasons to avoid any contact with government.18 In contrast,
corporations, employers, or managers are rarely charged with immigration violations, under policies that consider collateral consequences to them.19 Individuals that report abusive labor practices may be threatened with deportation by

13. Brandon L. Garrett, Declining Corporate Prosecutions, 57 A M. C RIM. L. R EV . 109, 110, 143–44
(2020).
14. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS
253-54 (2014) (describing range of “too big to jail” concerns with how organizations are prosecuted); Jed S.
Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan.
9,
2014),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/
[https://perma.cc/9PZ3-WQM2]..
15. See Caitlin Dickerson & Miriam Jordan, New Immigration Limits Cause Anxiety in Families and Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/us/trump-immigration-ban-covid.
html [https://perma.cc/ZBW4-UDSD]; see also H-1B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and
Development Project Workers, and Fashion Models, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.
gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-research-and-development-project-workers-and-fashion-models (Mar. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9J5R-QGH4].
16. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal
Illegal Entry (April 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policycriminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/DQG2-343J].
17. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 1830. But see Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1128–29 (2009).
18. Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1467–68
(2019).
19. See infra Part IV.
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those same employers.20 Prosecutors may not reward whistleblowers with leniency, as they typically do as a matter of policy and practice in other areas of
federal criminal practice.21
These are complex immigration and prosecution dynamics at the intersection of Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security practices,
and they have received little attention. The recent decline in corporate immigration enforcement has recently received some scattered media attention, as highprofile workplace raids, resulting in detention and prosecution of hundreds of
noncitizen employees, have not resulted in charges for employers or firms.22 The
Trump Organization has received scrutiny for employing undocumented workers.23 Yet there is still little scrutiny of the dramatic disconnect between policy
and practice of individual and corporate immigration enforcement by federal
prosecutors.24 Thus, a more basic goal of this Article is to describe the evolution
in corporate immigration prosecution, which itself has largely escaped scholarly
analysis, and which has received very little public attention generally, except to
a limited extent, when the Department of Justice first began to focus somewhat
more on corporate enforcement in the early 2000s.25 As Juliet Stumpf, who can
be credited with playing a central role in conceptualizing “crimmigration” not
20. Lee, supra note 17, at 1106–10.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Richard Fausset, After ICE Raids, a Reckoning in Mississippi’s Chicken County, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/us/mississippi-ice-raids-poultry-plants.html [https://perma.cc/
6TG5-9PSB] (noting that the Mississippi poultry company is currently challenging searches and raids of its properties in court, and that no executives have currently been charged).
23. Mike Baker, Firings at Trump Property Cap Years of Purging Undocumented Workers, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
26, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/31/us/trump-undocumented-workers-winery.html
[https://perma.cc/RGM7-YCEP] (“For years, the Trump Organization used undocumented workers to tend to its
hotels, golf courses and other properties, even as Donald Trump railed against the threat of illegal immigration
as both a candidate and president. This year, faced with a public reckoning after some of those workers came
forward, the organization has been cracking down. Dozens have been fired. The company vowed to follow what
was already a widespread industry practice of using E-Verify checks to confirm employment eligibility.”).
24. Regarding the challenges of prosecuting individuals in complex corporate matters, see SAMUEL BUELL,
CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 128–30 (2016) and
Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 D UKE L.J. 823, 823, 847–48 (2014). Regarding
the relative lack of focus in immigration scholarship on criminal, as opposed to civil enforcement, see Eagly,
supra note 2, at 1283–84.
25. There are more recent discussions of the importance of immigration rules in the corporate compliance
literature, highlighting the need to ensure that systems are in place to detect unauthorized employees. See, e.g.,
Rajiv S. Khanna, Corporate Immigration Policy: Why, What and How?, PRAC. LAW., April 2016 at 44, 45 (“Not
having a consistent and considered approach in dealing with immigration law exposes the employer and its management to criminal prosecution, civil litigation, corporate dissolution, loss of revenue streams, millions of dollars in fines, hundreds of hours in lost man hours spent in defending governmental investigations and actions,
loss of hired talent and loss of good will”); see also Thomas C. Green & Ileana M. Ciobanu, Deputizing—and
Then Prosecuting—America's Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43 A M. C RIM. L. R EV . 1203,
1204 (2006) (describing how, over a decade ago, federal prosecutions had “sought unprecedented penalties to
resolve immigration investigations,” in early efforts to enforce immigration rules against organizational violators); Eric Rich, Immigration Enforcement's Shift in the Workplace: Case of Md. Restaurateurs Reflects Use of
Criminal Investigations, Rather Than Fines, Against Employers, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2006), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/15/AR2006041501049.html
[https://perma.cc/K53BFPW7] (regarding media coverage of workplace raids and enforcement at that time); infra Part III.C (describing
more recent cases and coverage of them).
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just as a phenomenon but as a field, has written, “[I]mmigration law and the
criminal justice system are merely nominally separate.”26
For corporate offenders, that crimmigration connection looks completely
different, in the way that immigration law and criminal priorities intersect. Prior
work has not examined trends in corporate immigration prosecution, alongside
companion trends in individual immigration prosecutions. That corporations are
even subject to criminal immigration laws has largely escaped scholarly notice.
Most corporate criminal scholars have understandably focused on financial
crimes, and most immigration scholars have understandably focused on the human costs of enforcement.27 Yet, the trends in corporate immigration enforcement are not surprising from the perspective of corporate crime research and
data. Corporate prosecutions are generally declining in the United States at the
federal level, where the most significant such cases have long been brought.28
Updated data from the Duke and University of Virginia Corporate Prosecution
Registry, show how under the Trump Administration, corporate penalties have
declined sharply, as have numbers of prosecutions of public companies and financial institutions.29
This Article does not take any position on the question of whether it is desirable or sound to leverage corporations as immigration screeners to verify authorization of employees. Indeed, there are many reasons to think, for example,
that the federal databases that employers use to comply with screening mandates
are error prone, and that the approach creates a range of poor incentives.30 A
central concern is that criminal enforcement can magnify an abusive power dynamic that immigration screening creates between employers and workers. The

26. Stumpf, supra note 8, at 376; see also César Cuauhtémoc Garcí
a Hernández, Deconstructing Crimmigration, 52 U.C. D AVIS L. REV . 197, 208 (2018).
27. I have previously briefly noted data on corporate immigration prosecutions in a book surveying the
changing nature of corporate criminal prosecution. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 64 (noting ten deferred prosecution agreements with corporations for immigration violations); id. at 97, 210 (regarding prosecutions of both
employees and the corporations); id. at 99 (describing the Postville raids and resulting corporate prosecution); id.
at 264 (noting that while “[m]ore than a third of the federal docket now consists of prosecutions of noncitizens
who violated immigration rules, including by entering the country without permission,” in contrast, “[f]ew employers are prosecuted for immigration crimes.”). I am not aware of other scholarship exploring this topic.
28. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 21.
29. See Garrett, supra note 13, at 110; see also Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution
Registry, DUKE U. SCH. L. & U. VA. SCH. L. [hereinafter Duke/UVA Registry], http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7TZ6-TKRL]. This
registry aims to provide the most complete resource available on federal organizational prosecution, including
declinations, acquittals, trial convictions, deferred and nonprosecution agreements, and plea agreements with
corporations.
30. See Lee, supra note 17; Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify (and
Why They Should), 2 U.C. I RVINE L. REV . 381, 385 (2012). For a more detailed discussion in the context of the
E-Verify system, see infra Part II.C. See also Kati L. Griffith, Response Essay, ICE Was Not Meant to Be Cold:
The Case for Civil Rights Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the Workplace, 53 A RIZ. L. R EV . 1137,
1137 (2011); Shelly Chandra Patel, E-Verify: An Exceptionalist System Embedded in the Immigration Reform
Battle Between Federal and State Governments, 30 B.C. T HIRD W ORLD L.J. 453, 471–72 (2010). See generally
Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for
Reform, 36 H ARV . C.R.-C.L. L. REV . 345, 348 (2001); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented
Workers, 6 U. P A . J. L AB. & E MP . L. 497, 499 (2004).
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role played by corporate immigration prosecutions and nonprosecutions in these
power dynamics should be examined. Further, there are solutions that can at least
reduce perverse incentives and disparities, such as by incentivizing and providing leniency to whistleblowing employees that report labor and immigration violations by employers.
This Article begins descriptively, by examining which offenses in immigration law apply to criminalize individual and corporate behavior. Part II describes that legal background and then the changing trends in federal criminal
immigration enforcement policy and practice. Part III turns to the presentation of
detailed empirical data, from 2001–2019, concerning federal corporate immigration prosecutions. Next, Part IV examines the implications of corporate crimmigration for policy and practice. Under the current approach in which immigration
and criminal enforcement are closely intertwined, and individual criminal immigration prosecutions have reached record levels, it is important to examine
whether employers are being treated in a comparative hands-off manner, while
whistleblowing employees lack protection for their cooperation in reporting violations. This Article concludes by asking why individual and corporate enforcement have diverged so markedly in the immigration area, what the long-term
effects may be, as well as the implications for corporate accountability more generally. Now that the federal criminal dockets have become dominated by immigration enforcement, the problem of “corporate crimmigration” deserves renewed attention.
II. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
DEFENDANTS
This Part summarizes the relevant immigration provisions used in federal
prosecutions of individual persons and those typically used in federal prosecutions of organizations, along with a brief summary of trends in such enforcement.
The bulk of individual prosecutions are for unlawful reentry, while organizational prosecution cases focus on employment-related offenses.31 The focus here
is on federal criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses; in addition, a large
literature has described how federal immigration enforcement and deportation
has focused on noncitizens who have been arrested or charged with state criminal
offenses.32 Second, this Part summarizes how corporations are charged with federal offenses generally, including changes over the past two decades to the nonbinding guidelines that the Department of Justice has adopted to inform decisions
whether to prosecution corporations. Third, this Part describes how ICE has

31. See Kit Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Federal Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, 92 DENV.
U.L. REV. 863, 865 (2015); Nessel, supra note 30, at 401.
32. In Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2019, “ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) officers arrested
approximately 143,000 aliens and removed more than 267,000.” U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS, supra note 6 (“More
than 86% of those arrested by ICE had criminal convictions or pending charges.”). Many of these were driving
related. See id. (“More than 74,000 convictions and charges for Driving Under the Influence.”).
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changed its priorities regarding workplace enforcement, to focus less on workplace raids and more on compliance and regulation of employers, including by
emphasizing the use of the E-Verify database and paper audits of employers.
A.

Federal Immigration Crime

Today, the most commonly prosecuted federal immigration crime is illegal
reentry into the United States.33 There more than 10 million unauthorized migrants in the United States, according to estimates.34 Many entered lawfully.35
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, for those who entered without lawful
inspection, it is a federal misdemeanor to unlawfully enter the country.36 It is
also a civil violation that makes such a person removable.37 It is a more serious
federal offense to unlawfully enter following a prior removal order. Rather than
a six-month maximum sentence for unlawful entry, for unlawful reentry, the sentence can be two years in prison, and if the prior removal was on the basis of
more serious criminal convictions, then the maximum sentence can be as high as
ten or twenty years.38 Unlawful reentry is the most commonly prosecuted federal
immigration crime, and 72% of noncitizens prosecuted each year are for unlawful reentry (first-time illegal entry is not commonly prosecuted).39 Those prosecutions are concentrated in the five federal districts along the U.S. border with
Mexico.40
One goal of the illegal reentry offense is to deter unlawful crossing at borders; another rationale is to focus on recent migrants and not on persons with
more established ties to the U.S.41 The approach towards border enforcement has
changed over the past two decades towards making far greater use of criminal
and not just civil tools to combat unlawful crossing, primarily at the U.S.-Mexico
border.42 The Department of Homeland Security has made referral for criminal
33. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 2 (“The five crime types for which non-U.S. citizens were most likely to
be prosecuted in U.S. district court in 2018 were illegal reentry (72% of prosecutions), drugs (13%), fraud (4.5%),
alien smuggling (4%), and misuse of visas (2%).”).
34. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW RSCH. CTR.: HISP. TRENDS, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 (2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2011/
02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends-2010/ [https://perma.cc/N6TM-ES27].
35. Id.
36. 8 U.S.C. §1325(a).
37. 8 U.S.C. §1182(A)(6)(i) (deeming inadmissible an “alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General”).
38. 8 U.S.C. §1326(a)–(b).
39. MOTIVANS supra note 4, at 2; see also John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Rise in U.S.
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/us/22crime.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/GY3A-2AHG].
40. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 2 (“Federal arrests in the five judicial districts on the U.S.-Mexico border
increased from 76,171 in 2017 to 126,293 in 2018 . . . .”).
41. David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient
Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. & POL’Y 411, 426 (2015).
42. Doug Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 126–27 (2012); Kit
Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Federal Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 863,
877 (2015).
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prosecution mandatory for these offenses since 2005, which in itself is a remarkable criminal referral policy, that few agencies adopt in any setting.43 The Department of Justice announced new policies, under the Trump Administration, in
2017, prioritizing removal of any noncitizens arrested or charged with any criminal offense, with no exceptions for any classes of noncitizens.44 Additional related policies announced in 2017 prioritizing the prosecution of immigration offenses, for all federal prosecutors, and in 2018, announcing a “Zero Tolerance”
policy emphasizing the priority for federal prosecutors in border states specifically.45 Under that policy, “to the extent practicable,” all cases referred by immigration authorities in the federal border districts were to be federally prosecuted. 46 Under the Trump Administration, those criminal referrals by
immigration agents to prosecutors dramatically increased.47
There has been a focus on quantity of individual immigration prosecutions
over the past decade-and-a-half, including a perception that when federal prosecutors have focused on serious immigration violations, and “organizational
rights,” but not low-level offenders, they have been taken to task.48 In general,
the average sentence for immigration offenses has been short, and it decreased
in fiscal year 2018 from twelve to ten months, even as the numbers of such offenses increased, to over 20,000 individuals convicted.49 Further, supervised release was ordered in more than half of immigration cases in fiscal year 2018,
43. Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Gov’t Affs., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec.),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/05/03/secretary-janet-napolitano-senate-committee-homeland-security-andgovernmental [https://perma.cc/PS9Q-TLM3] (describing goal of “Operation Streamline” as to “increase the
consequences for illegally crossing the border by criminally prosecuting illegal border-crossers”).
44. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL
INTEREST (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ95-83F2] (“[R]egardless of the basis of removability, Department personnel should prioritize removable aliens who: (I) have been convicted of any criminal offense; (2) have been charged with any criminal offense that has not been resolved; (3) have committed acts
which constitute a chargeable criminal offense . . . .”).
45. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal
Illegal Entry (April 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policycriminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/DQG2-343J] (“On April 11, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a renewed commitment to criminal immigration enforcement. As part of that announcement, the Attorney General issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors and directed them to prioritize the prosecution of
certain criminal immigration offenses. Today’s zero-tolerance policy further directs each U.S. Attorney’s Office
along the Southwest Border (i.e., Southern District of California, District of Arizona, District of New Mexico,
Western District of Texas, and the Southern District of Texas) to adopt a policy to prosecute all Department of
Homeland Security referrals of section 1325(a) violations, to the extent practicable.”).
46. Id. For a detailed description of these policy decisions, see Eagly, supra note 7, at 1983–91.
47. MOTIVANS, supra note 4, at 2 (“There were 21 federal criminal immigration arrests per 100 apprehensions by the U.S. border patrol in the southwest border patrol sectors in 2018, up from 12 per 100 in 2017 . . . .”);
Eagly, supra note 7, at 1990–91 (“President Trump inherited a federal criminal system that already prosecuted
huge numbers of immigration cases.”).
48. Johnson, supra note 42, at 871–72 (describing early-2000’s focus of the U.S. Attorney for Southern
California). Regarding the increase in immigration detention facilities, see Kaufman, supra note 6, at 1401–08.
49. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 9. Ingrid Eagly provides a wonderful overview of trends in
criminal immigration enforcement and similarly describes how since 2000, average and median sentences for
illegal reentry have steadily declined. Eagly, supra note 7, at 1987 n.102 (“The average sentence also declined
from thirty-six months in 2000 to only ten months in 2018.”). But the numbers of illegal reentry cases have almost
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reflecting the fact that deportation would follow the sentence.50 A separate set of
offenses relate to harboring, hiring, and transporting noncitizens, under 8 U.S.C.
§1324.51 As the Second Circuit has held, harboring can extend to the knowing
employment of unauthorized noncitizens.52
Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), employers, in particular, are obligated to verify, using an I-9 form, that all employees hired are not unauthorized aliens, based on an examination of certain types
of documents.53 For the first time, employers were prohibited from hiring employees not authorized to work and requiring them to screen for immigration
status. 54 Those I-9 forms must be retained by employers. 55 Further, § 1324
makes knowing employment of an “unauthorized alien” unlawful; the statute
does not require employers to take more than reasonable efforts to assess the
accuracy or validity of the documents that the employee provides.56 A range of
civil penalties apply to violations of the Act.57
The employment provisions of §1324(a) also include a range of criminal
offenses. They make it a misdemeanor to engage in a “pattern or practice” of
knowingly hiring illegal aliens.58 The Act also makes it a felony to employ, during a one-year period, at least ten noncitizens with actual knowledge that they

tripled, from 6,415 in 2000 to 18,241 cases in 2018. Id. at 1988 tbl.1. Eagly notes that the decline in sentences
may reflect both the advisory sentencing guidelines after United States v. Booker and increased awareness, as
well as acknowledge by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, that the guidelines recommendations in immigration
cases may be unduly harsh. Id. at 1989.
50. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 10.
51. 8 U.S.C. §1324 prohibits, regarding a person who is an alien, and with knowledge or reckless disregard
for the person’s lack of authorization to enter, (1) bringing to such a person the United States; (2) transporting or
moving such a person within the United States; (3) harboring or concealing within the United States; (4) encouraging or inducing such a person to enter or reside in the United States (or engaging in conspiracy to do); and
(5) hiring at least ten such persons for employment. See Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring
Doctrine, 24 GEO. I MMIGR. L.J. 147, 147 (2010) (examining the effect of the harboring doctrine on U.S. immigration enforcement).
52. United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 573–74 (2d Cir. 1999).
53. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(b) (codifying Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§101(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3365–68); see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (“The person or entity must attest, under
penalty of perjury and on a form designated or established by the Attorney General by regulation, that it has
verified that the individual is not an unauthorized alien by examining [certain specified categories of documents].”)
54. See 8 U.S.C. §1324a(b)(1)(A).
55. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(b)(3), (b)(4) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the person or entity may
copy a document presented by an individual pursuant to this subsection and may retain the copy, but only (except
as otherwise permitted under law) for the purpose of complying with the requirements of this subsection.”).
56. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1), (a)(2); Steiben v. Immigr. Nat. Serv., 932 F.2d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1991) (“In
an effort to deter illegal immigration, Congress designed . . . [§1324a] to control the unlawful employment of
aliens in the United States by subjecting persons or entities who hire unauthorized aliens to civil and criminal
penalties.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, at 61–62 (1986) (stating: “[i]t is not expected that employers ascertain the legitimacy of documents presented during the verification process,” and “[t]he ‘reasonable man’ standard
is to be used in implementing this provision and the Committee wishes to emphasize that documents that reasonably appear to be genuine should be accepted by employers without requiring further investigation of those documents.”).
57. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §1324a(f); 8 C.F.R. §274a.10(b)(1)(ii); 8 U.S.C. §1324c(d)(3)(A).
58. See 8 U.S.C. §1324a(f)(1); 8 C.F.R. §274a.10(a).
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are noncitizens ineligible to work, with a maximum sentence of five years.59 The
Act provides for a felony sentence of up to ten years, if the person was part of an
organization that transported groups of ten or more persons at a time across the
border in a manner that endangered lives, or for certain violations done for “commercial gain or private financial advantage. . . .”60 Section 1327 makes it a crime
to knowingly aid or assist an inadmissible noncitizen who has been convicted of
an aggravated felony to enter the United States.61
A third set of immigration offenses, of high salience in workplace settings,
relate to identity theft. It is a federal crime to possess or use false immigration
documents or social security numbers.62 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines address
immigration crimes specifically, with recent revisions to the smuggling, transportation, and harboring guidelines.63
But, as the Sentencing Commission reports, the vast bulk of immigration
charges were for unlawful reentry, or unlawfully remaining in the U.S. without
authority (82.4% of all cases), with much of the remainder (12.8%) being smuggling offenses.64 The employment offenses, which might more commonly involve corporations, are not commonly charged.65 Workplace raids appear to have
increased in recent years, after a decline during the Obama Administration.66
Even a very large workplace raid, such as a raid that resulted in 280 detentions
near Dallas, Texas, is extremely small as compared with the tens of thousands
detained at any given time who are not arrested in any workplace setting.67 Thus,
in fiscal year 2018, the Department of Homeland Security reported a record total
of 158,581 administrative arrests, of which about 110,000 occurred in prisons or
jails, while about 40,000 occurred “at large” in the community.68 The vast majority of those persons were arrested by immigration officers having already been

59. 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(3)(A).
60. 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(B)(i).
61. 8 U.S.C. §1327.
62. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1546(a) (criminalizing possession or use of a false immigration document); 42
U.S.C. §408(a)(7) (criminalizing false representation of a Social Security number).
63. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER ON IMMIGRATION GUIDELINES 1–4 (2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Immigration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LR5F-Q2FN].
64. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 3, at 12.
65. See id. at 21.
66. Miriam Jordan, ICE Arrests Hundreds in Mississippi Raids Targeting Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/ice-raids-mississippi.html [https://perma.cc/FVS9UGQZ].
67. Phil Helsel, ICE Arrests More Than 280 at Texas Business, Biggest Workplace Immigration Raid in a
Decade, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ice-arrests-more-280texas-business-biggest-workplace-immigration-raid-n990766 [https://perma.cc/93NT-E2BV]; see also Jordan,
supra note 66 (discussing examples of particularly large-scale workplace immigration raids); Natalie Kitroeff,
Workplace Raids Signal Shifting Tactics in Immigration Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/economy/immigration-raids.html [https://perma.cc/MFY6-E4NC] (addressing
recent upticks in workplace immigration raids but acknowledging they are not a common occurrence).
68. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS
REPORT, 1, 2 fig.1 (2019), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W78M-HSS8].
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criminally arrested and detained by local law enforcement.69 In the report describing these record numbers of immigration arrests, DHS described, how the
“results clearly demonstrate that the increased enforcement productivity in
FY2017 has maintained an upward trend, and that ICE’s efforts to restore integrity to our nation’s immigration system and enhance the safety and security of
the United States have continued to yield positive results.”70 That report nowhere
discussed workplace arrests or enforcement against corporations. None of the
Bureau of Justice Statistics reports regarding immigration criminal enforcement,
cited in this section, discuss immigration charges filed against corporations.71
Similarly, in fiscal year 2019, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced record figures for individual immigration prosecutions.72 “These record-breaking
numbers are a testament to the dedication of our U.S. Attorneys’ Offices throughout the nation, especially our Southwest border offices,” said Deputy Attorney
General Jeffrey A. Rosen at the time.73 That efforts directed at a “crisis at the
border,” may then explain the lack of focus on interior and corporate enforcement.74
As discussed in the next section, the more recent data on corporate immigration enforcement, similarly suggests corporate offenses are a declining enforcement priority. Thus, one explanation for the lack of focus on corporate immigration violations is the lack of focus on the employment setting more
generally, in contrast to the focus on border crossing, for which the Department
of Justice has adopted “zero tolerance” policies and dedicated resources, and the
interior focus on arrest of individuals screened and identified by local law enforcement in jails.75 But, when workplace raids do occur, and they have apparently increased recently, one also observes less focus on corporate employers.76
That disconnect raises still additional questions about the relationship between
immigration law, criminal law, and corporate crime.
B.

Federal Corporate Prosecutions

In general, large-scale federal corporate prosecutions, for any criminal offense, are a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back just over two decades. In this
Section, I provide a thumbnail overview of the change to corporate prosecution
practice in this section; a substantial literature has detailed the changes to policy
69. Id. at 6–7 figs.3, 5.
70. Id. at 14–15.
71. See, e.g., id. at 1–2; Motivans, supra note 4, at 20, tbl.16 (2019). The increase was driven by a surge
in illegal reentry charges, in the five federal districts along the U.S. Mexico Border. Id. at 1–2.
72. Press Release, Off. Pub. Aff., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Department of Justice Prosecuted a Record-Breaking Number of Immigration-Related Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/department-justice-prosecuted-record-breaking-number-immigration-related-cases-fiscal-year
[https://perma.cc/UJ53-2PCW].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 68, at 4; Garrett, supra note 13, at 110; Press Release,
supra note 45 (announcing a zero-tolerance policy for criminal illegal entry).
76. See Jordan, supra note 66 (discussing increased immigration enforcement at business place but noting
those arrested were employees, not employers); Helsel, supra note 67.
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and practice that have transformed federal corporate prosecutions over the past
two decades.77 While prior to the 1990s, large corporate prosecutions were relatively unusual, when the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were adopted in
1992, federal prosecutors had far clearer rules for how to criminally sentence an
organization.78 The practice of charging corporations had become an increasingly important and common practice by the end of the 1990s, as reflected in
then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder’s memo setting out for the first time
a set of Department of Justice principles for the practice of charging corporate
defendants.79
In the early 2000’s, a new approach gradually transformed the practice of
corporate prosecutions, as the DOJ emphasized large-scale settlements using deferred and nonprosecution agreements. 80 Such deferred and nonprosecution
agreements became the mechanism of choice for prosecuting large public corporations during that time period.81 By 2015, federal prosecutors were charging
large numbers of financial institutions, which had rarely been prosecuted in the
past.82 Prosecutors began to use criminal statutes, such as the Bank Secrecy Act
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, that had been neglected in prior years, in
organization cases.83
The Department of Justice developed written policies concerning corporate
prosecutions during this time period.84 The DOJ continued to revise an increasingly detailed set of nonbinding principles for charging organizations, including
in response to concerns that policies resulted in overly lenient settlements for
corporations.85 These policies were incorporated into the U.S. Attorney’s Manual.86 The Obama Administration policies emphasized investigation of individual corporate offenders, and sought convictions against banks, rather than always
seeking out-of-court settlements.87
77. See generally Garrett, supra note 14 (discussing the development of corporate criminal responsibility
in U.S. law).
78. Id. at 154–55.
79. Id. at 55 (providing an overview of the changing approach towards corporate prosecution during the
1990s).
80. Id. (providing an overview of the changing approach towards corporate prosecution during the 2000s
and trends in enforcement during that time); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 V A . L. R EV .
853, 889 (2007) (describing rise in use of compliance and rehabilitative approaches towards corporate prosecutions); see also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 A M. C RIM. L. REV . 1095, 1097 (2006).
81. Garrett, supra note 80, at 886.
82. Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 Y ALE L.J.F. 33, 34 (2016) (detailing changing approach towards prosecution of financial institutions).
83. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 64.
84. Id. at 55.
85. Id. at 55–56.
86. Id. at 55.
87. Garrett, supra note 82, at 34–35; see Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, to Heads of Department Components & U.S. Attorneys, at 1 (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/CW6J-VHD7]; see also Brandon L. Garrett,
The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 61 (2016); Elizabeth E.
Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime,
101 V A . L. R EV . O NLINE 51, 52 (2015).
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Prior work has analyzed patterns in corporate criminal prosecutions during
this time period, as well as the accompanying array of changes in DOJ corporate
prosecution guidelines and practice.88 In recent years, a set of DOJ corporate
prosecution policy changes, some beginning under the Obama Administration,
but far more so under the Trump Administration, have softened corporate penalties and enforcement, and as developed in recent work examining subsequent
trends, the result has been a decline in corporate prosecutions and penalties.89
The decline in corporate immigration prosecutions, then, can be seen as a companion to the general decline in corporate prosecutions, in numbers as well as in
the size of penalties.
C.

ICE Workplace Enforcement Policies and the Rise of E-Verify

The change towards a system in which the workplace became a site of immigration screening was gradual, and it unfolded decades after the IRCA first
required that employers verify immigration status in I-9 forms.90 As I will describe, by the late 1990s, early databases were developed with which employers
could seek to verify immigration status, rather than just depending on the paper
documentation that an employee provided.91 It was not until the early 2000s,
though, that workplace enforcement became a greater priority.92 Those enforcement actions brought some of the first large-scale criminal actions against corporate employers.93 Those efforts increased, though, under the Obama Administration, with the creation of the E-Verify database, permitting employers to
more readily screen for work authorization than they could by just visually examining identification to fill out an I-9.94 The new database increased the obligations of companies and brought with it a new focus on compliance, more auditing by immigration authorities, growing concerns about the accuracy and
negative consequences of the new system, as well as growing corporate prosecutions in the immigration area.95 As Stephen Lee has explored, the process of
deputizing employers as immigration screeners resulted in “our nation’s employers” becoming “a significant and significantly misunderstood group of immigration decision makers.”96
88. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 253–54.
89. GARRETT, supra note 13, at 109; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUST. MANUAL §9-28.210 (2018); see also
Danielle Ivory, Ben Protess & Robert Gebeloff, Four Takeaways From the Trump-Era Plunge in Corporate
Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/us/trump-corporate-penalties-secjustice.html [https://perma.cc/DF68-NYZ5]; Rick Claypool, ‘Law and Order’ Trump Is Soft on Corporate Crime
and Wrongdoing, PR WATCH (July 30, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2018/07/13374/laworder-trump-soft-corporate-crime-wrongdoing [https://perma.cc/YC2J-X2FW].
90. Lee, supra note 17, at 1105–07.
91. Id. at 1108 n.13.
92. Id. at 1129.
93. Id. at 1141.
94. Stumpf, supra note 30, at 383 n.9.
95. Id. at 384–85.
96. Lee, supra note 17, at 1105. For additional criticism, see, for example, Maurice A. Roberts & Stephen
Yale-Loehr, Employers as Junior Immigration Inspectors: The Impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 21 I NT ’ L L AW. 1013, 1014 (1987); Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through
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As part of this focus on compliance, in 1996, as part of the Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRIRA), Congress mandated the creation of an employment verification database.97 In 1997, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) released the first version of what would become E-Verify, a “Basic Pilot,” to allow employers to better conduct due diligence on
employee identity information.98 A federal database was made available, to allow a company to check a person’s photo and social security number as against
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) databases.99
Today, the E-Verify system will inform the employer whether a person is
confirmed as “Employment Authorized,” or a “tentative nonconfirmation,” or
“TNC,” after which an employer must review the finding with the employee; at
that stage, the employee has eight days to contact the SSA and DHS, during
which time the employer cannot take action; if finalized, a “Final Nonconfirmation” is entered, only after which the employer is required to terminate employment.100 This system checks social security numbers, as noted, but it cannot ensure that the numbers themselves are legitimate; thus, a person could use a social
security number that belongs to another.
One of the first companies to volunteer to use this Basic Pilot early version
of this system was the large poultry company, Tyson Foods, which uncovered
violations and was prosecuted, after cooperating with a federal investigation.101
Tyson Foods, along with three managers, was later acquitted in a criminal prosecution.102
Workplace enforcement became a greater focus starting in the George W.
Bush Administration.103 In 2003, federal agents conducted workplace raids at
over sixty Wal-Mart stores, and concluded that unauthorized employees were
working at 1000 stores; the case resulted in a then-record $11 million civil payment, with an additional $4 million payment by contractors working with WalMart.104 At the time, the spokesperson for ICE explained, “we’re going for a
Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. L EGIS. & P UB. P OL’ Y 131, 131 (2002);
Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U.
C HI . L EGAL F. 193, 193 (2007).
97. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104–
208, div. C, §401(a) (1996); see also Chamber of Com. of the United States v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752
(10th Cir. 2010) (describing Basic Pilot program).
98. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 25, at 1216.
99. Id. at 1216–17.
100. See Stumpf, supra note 30, at 392–93 (describing E-Verify process); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., E-VERIFY USER MANUAL 111 (2018), https://www.e-verify.gov/e-verify-user-manual
[https://perma.cc/4UYF-LFBX].
101. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 25, at 1216–17.
102. See June D. Bell, Defense Wins of 2003: A “Less Is More” Strategy Clicks with Jury in Tyson Case,
NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 26, 2004).
103. I note that in addition to employer accountability for hiring noncitizens not authorized to work, the
Department of Justice also enforces Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §1324b, and 28 C.F.R.
Part 44, which prohibit discrimination on account of citizenship status in hiring, firing, recruitment, or referral
for a fee.
104. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 25, at 1214–15.
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larger breadth of investigations and bigger civil settlements and criminal
fines.”105 Even so, ICE also emphasized its goal to promote compliance at companies: “This case breaks new ground not only because this is a record dollar
amount for a civil immigration settlement, but because this settlement requires
Wal-Mart to create an internal program to ensure future compliance with immigration laws by Wal-Mart contractors and by Wal-Mart itself.”106 Thus, “ICE is
committed to not only bringing charges against companies that violate our nation’s immigration laws, but also working with them to ensure that they have
programs in place to prevent future violations.”107
In April 2009, under Secretary Janet Napolitano, DHS Guidelines issued to
ICE field offices instructed agents “to take aim at employers and supervisors for
prosecution ‘through the use of carefully planned criminal investigations.’”108
At the time, individual enforcement had been the priority; for example, in 2008,
while 6,000 people had been arrested in workplace raids, only 135 were employers or managers.109 Still additional corporate criminal cases were brought during
this time.110 These Guidelines, titled a “Worksite Enforcement Strategy,” emphasized that the “prospect for employment” is “one of the leading causes of
illegal immigration.”111 The Guidelines explained that: “Enforcement efforts focused on employers better target the root causes of illegal immigration.”112 They
stated that: “ICE must prioritize the criminal prosecution of actual employers
who knowingly hire illegal workers because such employers are not sufficiently
punished or deterred by the arrest of their illegal work force.”113 In particular,
the Guidelines stated that an “effective strategy” must (1) penalize employers
who “knowingly hire illegal workers,” (2) deter employers “tempted” to do so,
and (3) “encourage all employers to take advantage of well-crafted compliance
tools.”114 This approach resembles the approach which, as described in Section
II.B., has taken hold in corporate prosecution efforts more generally, and in a
host of regulatory contexts. Violating corporations were to be punished, but efforts also focused on deterring would-be violators and incentivizing compliance,
105. Id. at 1215.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1216.
108. For an overview, see Ginger Thompson, Immigration Agents to Turn Focus to Employers, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/us/politics/30immig.html [https://perma.cc/PY2BSBAF]
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, E. DIST. OF TEX., Justice Department and Immigration
& Customs Enforcement Reach $4.5 Million Agreement with Pilgrim's Pride (Dec. 30, 2009) (discussing agreement Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation to pay $4.5 million and adopt more stringent immigration compliance practices
in exchange for investigation conclusion); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat,
101 V A . L. R EV . 1789, 1853 (2015) (discussing criminal prosecution of individuals and corporations).
111. Memorandum from Marcy M. Forman, Director, Office of Investigations, to Assistant Director, Deputy Assistant Directors & Special Agents in Charge, Worksite Enforcement Strategy, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Apr. 30, 2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/worksite_enforcement_
strategy4_30_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P9D-3YBL].
112. Id. at 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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using E-Verify, so that corporations can themselves prevent violations through
their own procedures and due diligence.
Some of that work would occur through administrative and civil tools. Immigration violations are civil, and conversely, large numbers of individual deportations occur through substantial cooperation between local law enforcement
and immigration authorities.115 Further blurring the civil and criminal lines, the
FBI enters immigration information into its criminal databases.116 There is not
the same cooperative relationship and effort to target employers.117 But, civil enforcement by immigration officers is routine.118 For example, ICE offices were
asked to conduct Form I-9 audits, to assess the identify of workers at companies
and check for irregularities.119 If ICE determines that an employer has violated
the law and should be fined, it issues a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF).120 NIFs
may result in final orders for monetary penalties, settlements, or case dismissals.121 Employers who have engaged in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring
unauthorized immigrants can also be criminally prosecuted.122 Civil fines were
to be used where criminal prosecutions are not appropriate, as well as debarment
proceedings against companies that hired illegal workers, preventing them from
work on federal contracts.123
The Guidelines also reshaped how enforcement efforts were to proceed,
with a greater focus on corporations than in the past. Crucially, agents were instructed to “obtain indictments, criminal arrest or search warrants, or a commitment from a U.S. attorney’s office to prosecute the targeted employer, before
arresting employees for civil immigration violations at a work site.”124 They required that at least fourteen days before conducting a raid, the relevant field office notify ICE headquarters with information including a proposed strategy for
prosecuting the employer.125
The E-Verify system helped to make this new focus on corporate compliance in immigration possible. As Juliet Stumpf puts it, “E-Verify represents a
significant step beyond IRCA in entrenching immigration enforcement in the
workplace.”126 In July 2009, all federal employers and contractors were required

115. See Stumpf, supra note 8, at 388–89; 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (authorizing Attorney General to enter
agreements with state law enforcement to perform functions of immigration officers).
116. Stumpf, supra note 8, at 389; Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 6 U. P A. J. C ONST . L. 1084, 1086 (2004).
117. See Thompson, supra note 108.
118. See Memorandum, supra note 111, at 1.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 3.
121. See Form I-9 Inspection Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Aug. 19, 2019), https://
www.ice.gov/factsheets/i9-inspection [https://perma.cc/V528-GUN4].
122. See Memorandum, supra note 111, at 2.
123. Id. at 2–3.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Thompson, supra note 108.
126. Stumpf, supra note 30, at 394.
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to participate in E-Verify, a database created in the late 1990s that permits employers to verify identify of potential or current employees.127 The commitment
was reiterated in 2013: “ICE will focus its resources within the worksite enforcement program on the criminal prosecution of employers who knowingly hire illegal workers in order to target the root cause of illegal immigration.”128 The
focus was not on large workplace raids, but rather on promoting compliance
through prosecutions, I-9 inspections, civil fines, and debarment, as well as educational efforts.129 In 2012, then-Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano
described how since the new policies took effect in 2009, “ICE has audited more
than 8,079 employers suspected of knowingly hiring workers unauthorized to
work in the United States, debarred 726 companies and individuals, and imposed
more than $87.9 million in financial sanctions.”130
The E-Verify system expanded the ability for companies to themselves
conduct screening of employees, growing out of the earlier Basic Pilot database,
by permitting rapid checks of employee social security numbers, where mandated by federal law for federal agencies and contractors, and by a growing number of states that have required at least some employers to use the system.131 At
its inception, it provided a way for corporations to assure compliance, where earlier, they could not necessarily be expected to detect whether employee identification documents were valid or not. 132 Shortly after E-Verify was launched,
then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano added, that “Employer enrollment in EVerify, our on-line employee verification system managed by USCIS, has more

127. See E-VERIFY, https://www.e-verify.gov (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [https://perma.cc/P3GJ-7BMN]
(“[A] web-based system that allows enrolled employers to confirm the eligibility of their employees to work in
the United States”); see also Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Secretary Napolitano Strengthens Employment Verification with Administration’s Commitment to E-Verify (July 8, 2009), https://www.dhs.gov/
news/2009/07/08/administration-commits-e-verify-strengthens-employment-verification [https://perma.cc/72
WC-FL7R] (“Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano today strengthened employment eligibility verification by announcing the Administration’s support for a regulation that will award federal
contracts only to employers who use E-Verify to check employee work authorization.”); THE WHITE HOUSE,
BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM at 21–22 (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHZ7-9FC2] (regarding
the new approach making E-Verify mandatory).
128. Amy Sherman, Obama Holds Record for Cracking Down on Employers Who Hire Undocumented
Workers, POLITIFACT, (July 3, 2013), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2013/jul/03/debbie-wassermanschultz/obama-holds-record-cracking-down-employers-who-hir/ [https://perma.cc/EJA9-MVLN].
129. See id.
130. Written Testimony of U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano for a House
Committee on the Judiciary hearing titled “Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security” DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (July 17, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/07/17/written-testimony-dhs-secretary-janetnapolitano-house-committee-judiciary-hearing [https://perma.cc/6FES-6CGJ].
131. E-Verify States Map, LAWLOGIX, https://www.lawlogix.com/e-verify-map/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/HT3Y-WYVS] (showing state E-Verify requirements as of 2019 by map).
132. For early work describing the costs and benefits of the new E-Verify system, see Danielle M. Kidd,
Note, E-Verify: Promoting Accountability and Transparency in Federal Procurement through Electronic Employment Verification, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 829, 830 (2011); Carl Wohlleben, Note, E-Verify, A Piece of the Puzzle
Not a Brick in the Wall: Why All U.S. Employers Should Be Made to Use E-Verify, Just Not Yet, 36 R UTGERS
C OMPUT . & T ECH . L.J. 137, 137–38 (2009).
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than doubled since January 2009, with more than 385,000 participating companies representing more than 1.1 million hiring sites.”133 Secretary Napolitano
added that they had “continued to promote and strengthen E-Verify, developing
a robust customer service and outreach staff to increase public awareness of EVerify’s benefits and inform employers and employees of their rights and responsibilities.”134 Secretary Napolitano noted, “More than 17 million queries
were processed in E-Verify in Fiscal Year 2011, allowing businesses to verify
the eligibility of their employees to work in the United States.”135 Further, they
also launched the E-Verify Self Check program, a “voluntary, free, fast, and secure online service that allows individuals in the United States to confirm the
accuracy of government records related to their employment eligibility status before seeking employment.”136
At the time, President Barack Obama emphasized:
It means cracking down more forcefully on businesses that knowingly hire undocumented workers…most businesses want to do the right thing … So we
need to implement a national system that allows businesses to quickly and accurately verify someone’s employment status. And if they still knowingly hire
undocumented workers, then we need to ramp up the penalties.137

Scholarship examining the use of E-Verify has been less sanguine, describing errors when it is used, 138 whether it permits state regulation of immigration,139 or harms labor protections for undocumented workers,140 and whether it
imposes costs on the population as a whole through a combination of “error,
misuse, discriminatory effect, or a decrease in individual autonomy.”141
Thus, with the creation of E-Verify, the Administration conveyed that enforcement against violating employers would increase as employers could be expected to adopt a higher degree of due diligence. The system focused far more

133. Written Testimony of U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, supra note
130.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See the White House President Barack Obama, Strengthening Enforcement, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE
ARCHIVES, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/immigration/strengthening-enforcement (last visited
Jan. 18. 2021) [https://perma.cc/674M-RJFZ]; Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Fixing Our Broken Immigration Systems so Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-so-everyone-plays-rules
[https://perma.cc/UT7U-XMHC].
138. See Amy Peck, Latest Report on E-Verify: The Good, The Bad and the Unresolved, LAWLOGIX
(Jan. 20, 2011), https://www.lawlogix.com/latest-report-on-e-verify-the-good-the-bad-and-the-unresolved/
[https://perma.cc/3ZUL-QFD5] (describing errors as “still a way of life” for E-Verify users).
139. See Jaime Walter, Comment, Congressional Preemption of Work-Authorization Verification Laws: A
Narrower Approach to Defining the Scope of Preemption, 45 U.S.F.L. REV. 289, 307 (2010).
140. See, e.g., Rachel Feller, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona’s Improper
Legislation in the Field of “Immigration-Related Employment Practices,” 84 WASH . L. REV . 289, 304 (2009);
Lora L. Ries, B-Verify: Transforming E-Verify into a Biometric Employment Verification System, 3 A LB. GOV ’ T
L. R EV . 271, 285–86 (2010).
141. See Stumpf, supra note 30, at 385.
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on private workplace immigration screening.142 While companies might expect
that E-Verify would lead to fewer immigration raids, they may have also been
subjected to more raids, based on E-Verify information, whether accurate or
not.143 Whether it created a sound system or not,144 in response to the rise of EVerify, corporate employers played a growing role as immigration screeners. As
described in the next Part, corporate prosecutions for immigration violations initially increased under those new policies, centering on the E-Verify system.
III. CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS
This Part describes new data regarding corporate prosecutions generally,
and federal corporate immigration prosecutions specifically. These data are gathered from the Duke and UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry, which is the most
comprehensive resource available regarding federal prosecutions of organizations, with a dataset that begins in 2001.145 As described below, while corporate
immigration enforcement increased under the Obama Administration ICE workplace policies beginning in 2009, in the past few years under the Trump Administration, such enforcement has notably declined.146 Nor is there evidence, as I
describe, that administrative and civil enforcement has compensated for the lack
of corporate criminal enforcement.147
A.

Trends in Corporate Immigration Enforcement

These data collected concerning corporate prosecutions are reflected in the
Appendix, which details all federal corporate prosecutions located from 2001–
2019, and which are available along with docket entries and the text of agreements at the Duke and UVA Corporate Prosecution Registry. Summarizing these
data, Figure 1 below displays numbers of corporate immigration prosecutions
from 2001 to 2019. One can readily observe that beginning in 2005, corporate
immigration prosecutions increased, as priorities at ICE and the Department of
Justice changed. Following that time period, as described in Section II.C., the EVerify system accompanied new Guidelines and a new approach towards compliance and enforcement for corporations, cementing the focus that began in the
George W. Bush Administration on corporate enforcement. Following the
Obama Administration, while trends varied, these corporate immigration cases
142. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006
U. I LL. L. R EV . 887, 940–41 (2006).
143. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C.
D AVIS L. R EV . 1081, 1091, 1098–100 (2008).
144. Regarding E-Verify error rates, see Stumpf, supra note 30, at 399 (“E-Verify underverifies. Database
inadequacies and user error create erroneous failures to confirm a small percentage of employees who are work
authorized. In 2009, 2.6% of employees screened generated a tentative nonconfirmation response. Of the total
number of tentative nonconfirmations, between 22% and 95% were erroneous.”).
145. See Duke/UVA Registry, supra note 29. The Registry also includes pre-2001 deferred and nonprosecution agreements with organizations; the more complete collection that includes plea agreements, declinations,
and trial judgments, begins in 2001.
146. See discussion infra Section III.A.
147. See discussion infra Section III.D.

GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2]

3/29/2021 8:06 PM

CORPORATE CRIMMIGRATION

379

continued to be brought in larger numbers through 2014, which was a record year
in terms of numbers of cases brought. One then sees a drop-off, below in Figure
1, regarding numbers of cases brought per year. These data reflect the year in
which a case was resolved, and thus, a case settled in a prosecution agreement or
judgment in a given year may reflect an investigation initiated several years prior.
FIG. 1. ANNUAL NUMBER CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS,
2001-19
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The numbers of cases do not reflect the seriousness or size of the cases or
the conduct involved. The penalties imposed in a case provide one measure of
the severity of the conduct. The trend in penalties is slightly different than the
trend concerning numbers of corporate immigration prosecutions.
As Figure 2 shows below, total penalties spiked later, in 2017–2018, with
several large cases brought in each of those years. This reflects the impact of a
handful of cases with very large fines, as set out in the Appendix. As described
in the next Section, although there were two large cases in 2017–2018, both were
legacy cases from the prior Administration, that had been in development for
many years. These trends cannot address whether in the investigation pipeline
there are similar cases which may be settled in future years. But the drop-off
suggests that there is, at minimum, a years-long slowdown in the resolution of
large corporate immigration prosecutions under the new Administration.
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FIG. 2. CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PENALTIES, 2001-19
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In reviewing the types of companies prosecuted for immigration prosecutions, one can readily observe common themes. Most are smaller companies, and
the industries are typically agriculture, contracting and construction, food processing, and smaller manufacturers. This is consistent with data on which industries are most likely to employ unauthorized immigrant workers; the industries
are often lower paying and with relatively more dangerous working conditions.148
B.

The Rise in Corporate Immigration Prosecutions

Immigration enforcement brought during the Obama Administration as
against corporate employers reflected the policy changes just described. In 2006,
for example, federal agents conducted raids at forty shipping pallet factories operated by IFCO Systems.149 Agents detained more than a thousand noncitizens
and estimated there were thousands more—more than half of IFCO employees
had false Social Security numbers.150 Managers were charged with immigration
violations.151 IFCO paid almost $21 million in fines, including back wages and
civil penalties, and agreed to take compliance measures, including joining the EVerify system allowing instant checks on employee social security numbers.152

148. JEFFREY S. PASSEL AND D’VERA COHN, PEW RSCH. CTR., OCCUPATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT WORKERS (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2016/11/03/occupations-of-unauthorized-immigrant-workers/ [https://perma.cc/9HGN-EP6D].
149. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 264.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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In another case, WesternGeco paid $19.6 million in fines for submitting fraudulent visa applications for workers on Gulf of Mexico oil vessels.153 It is common
for recent corporate settlements to require that the company continue to use the
E-Verify system; of course, for many of them, where the company was already
using E-Verify, the provision suggests that it was not effectively prevent violations.154 Other agreements require a company to participate in E-Verify for the
first time.155
These cases can raise real practical challenges. For example, in May 2008,
one of the largest immigration raids in history swept a kosher meatpacking plant
in Postville, Iowa.156 More than 300 employees were arrested, and within days
more than 250 pleaded guilty to immigration crimes.157 In expedited hearings in
groups of five, they pleaded guilty to lesser offenses of misuse of Social Security
cards, rather than the aggravated identity theft charges for which they were arrested.158 The arrests and prosecutions were a change in federal practice; in the

153. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. S.D. Tex. (Jun. 16, 2006), https://2001-2009.state.gov/m/
ds/rls/67985.htm [https://perma.cc/376S-5L4X].
154. See, e.g., ABC Professional Trees Services, Inc., Nonprosecution Agreement at 2 (May 14, 2012),
https://corporate-prosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/ABC.pdf [https://perma.cc/VDE9QWQF] (“It is further understood that ABC Professional Tree Services: (a) shall continue to use E-Verify . . .”);
Advanced Containment Systems, Inc., Nonprosecution Agreement at 2 (Dec. 5, 2011), https://corporate-prosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/advanced-containment-systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GS
6-3YYT] (“It is further understood that ACSI and its subsidiaries: (a) shall continue to use E-Verify . . .”); Atrium
Companies, Inc., Nonprosecution Agreement at 2 (Jan. 6, 2012), https://corporate-prosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/atrium.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NJN-X622] (“It is further understood that Atrium
Companies and its subsidiaries: (a) shall continue to use E-Verify . . .”).
155. Plea Agreement at 4, United States. v. Behrmann Meat Processing, Inc., No. 12-30156-DRH (S.D. Ill.
Jun. 29, 2012), https://corporate-prosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/Behrmann-Meat.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KJ6-VW8X] (“The Defendants agree to participate in an ‘e-verify’ program . . .”); Plea Agreement at 6, United States v. EuroFresh, Inc., No. 11-Mj-4007-6FE (Dist. Ariz. Aug. 26, 2011), https://corporateprosecution-registry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/EurofreshInc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Q4M-P3JE]
(“Additional compliance measures shall include . . . [d]ocumentation of E-verify and other checks done for each
signed Form I-9[.]”); Settlement Agreement Regarding IFCO Systems, N.A., Inc. 11 (Dec. 19, 2008) (“Use of
the Department of Homeland Security’s ‘E-Verify’ program for all hiring[.]”); Plea Agreement at 7, United States
v. Triangle Grading and Paving, Inc., No. 1:14CR264-1 (M.D. N.C. July 8, 2014), https://corporate-prosecutionregistry.s3.amazonaws.com/media/agreement/triangle-grading.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KXB-RMXP] (“The defendant . . . agrees to take the following compliance measures . . . [u]se E-Verify continuously and comprehensively . . . [p]rovide annual E-Verify and I-9 training to human resources personnel conducted by an independent
third party subject matter expert . . . [i]mplement an employee hotline to report suspected instances of improper
conduct related to I-9 and E-Verify compliance.”).
156. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99.
157. Id.
158. Sarah B. Horton, From “Deportability” to “Denounce-Ability:” New Forms of Labor Subordination
in an Era of Governing Immigration Through Crime, 39 POLAR: POL. AND LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 312,
312 (2016) (“In expedited hearings, migrants, bound by handcuffs at the wrists and with chains extending from
their torsos to their ankles, pled guilty to Social Security fraud in groups of five . . . .”).
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past, deportations might have resulted from such a raid, but not added-on criminal charging. 159 The prosecutions were the beginning of a trend towards far
greater interior criminal enforcement of immigration offenses.160
The raids led to action against the corporation and management, too, which
also represented a new trend. A local Postville official complained, “They don’t
go after employers. They don’t put CEOs in jail.”161 Yet, in that case, the Department of Justice did bring charges against higher-ups, including the CEO, and
the corporation itself, Agriprocessors, Inc.162 Unlike the cases against immigrant
workers, which were fast-tracked and resolved using lenient pleas within days,
resulting in deportations, this corporate case plodded along, underscoring the
complexity of bringing such prosecutions.163 The CEO went on trial in late 2009
and was convicted, but not of immigration-related charges, rather of bank fraud
charges related to efforts to sell the company; President Trump commuted the
sentence in 2017.164 The government eventually dismissed all of the charges
against Agriprocessors, Inc. after the company went bankrupt.165 The company
could not pay a fine before these dismissals occurred, because it was “an empty
shell.”166
C.

Recent Trends in Corporate Immigration Prosecution

Not only have the numbers of corporate immigration cases declined since
2016, but so have total penalties.167 The decline in penalties is not as steep, however, because two of the largest penalties were recent: the Waste Management of
Texas penalty of $5.5 million, imposed in 2018, and the Asplundh Tree Services

159. Id. (“The aggressive raid in Postville marked a departure from customary ICE procedure during
worksite raids, which was to deport detained migrants without prosecuting them for immigration-related conduct.”).
160. Id. at 313 (“As the border has migrated inward, spaces of everyday life-including workplaces, homes,
and neighborhoods-have become subjected to intensified policing on an unprecedented scale.”).
161. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99.
162. Press Release, FBI, Former CEO of Agriprocessors Sentenced to 27 Years in Federal Prison (Jun. 22,
2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/omaha/press-releases/2010/om062210.htm [https://perma.cc/APP7YNR4].
163. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99.
164. JTA, Trump Commutes Sentence of Agriprocessors’ CEO Sholom Rubashkin, JEWISH WEEK: FOOD &
WINE, (Dec. 21, 2017), https://jwfoodandwine.com/article/2017/12/21/trump-commutes-sentence-agriprocessors-ceo-sholom-rubashkin [https://perma.cc/64SQ-JMVJ].
165. GARRETT, supra note 14, at 99.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see also supra Figure 2.
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penalty of $80 million (as well as an additional $15 million civil penalty), imposed in 2016.168 Both, however, were cases that had been in progress from the
prior administration.169
In the Asplundh case, three managers, including a vice president, had
pleaded guilty to immigration offenses.170 The combined civil and criminal penalty in the case was the largest ever in an immigration matter.171 The settlements
concluded a six-year investigation.172 The company, in addition to paying the
fine, described taking “immediate corrective action,” including having hired new
compliance staff, adopted a new facial recognition system, and described its efforts to end the practices, from 2010–2014, that resulted in the prosecution.173
The Waste Management case had begun with searches in 2012 and indictments of three managers in 2014, for a “scheme to employ undocumented aliens
as helpers on waste trucks picking up garbage in and around Houston.”174 This
was part of a larger pattern at the company, which, “hired manual laborers with
little or no regard for their legal status for almost 10 years.”175 Nevertheless, the
company was offered leniency; the U.S Attorney explained: “In considering
whether to enter into such agreements, we must take into account the collateral
consequences that a criminal prosecution would have on the company’s contracts
with many municipalities across the country and the thousands of employees for
the conduct of three managers at one operating unit in Houston.”176 Thus, collateral consequences were a deciding factor in offering leniency to the company,
which forfeited $5.5 million of its gains from the scheme, but which did not pay
a criminal fine, and which did not receive a criminal conviction or an indictment,
but rather a nonprosecution agreement.177
168. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Waste Management to Forfeit $5.5 Million for Hiring Illegal Aliens
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/waste-management-forfeit-55-million-hiring-illegal-aliens [https://perma.cc/XY9A-L8QD]; Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. Pleads Guilty to
Unlawful Employment Of Aliens (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/asplundh-tree-expertsco-pleads-guilty-unlawful-employment-aliens [https://perma.cc/ZGG5-S8DN] (“Today marks the end of a
lengthy investigation by ICE Homeland Security Investigations into hiring violations committed by the highest
levels of Asplundh’s organization.”).
169. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Waste Management to Forfeit $5.5 Million for Hiring Illegal Aliens,
supra note 168; Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. Pleads Guilty to Unlawful Employment
of Aliens, supra note 168 (noting that the six-year investigation started in 2011).
170. Michael Rubinkam, Tree Company Asplundh to Pay Record Fine for Immigration Practices,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://apnews.com/685bfb24850f40909ab66688a862d148/Tree-companyto-pay-record-fine-for-immigration-practices [https://perma.cc/BM5C-D4SM].
171. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. Pleads Guilty to Unlawful Employment of
Aliens, supra note 168 (“The $95,000,000.00 recovery, including $80,000,000.00 criminal forfeiture money
judgment and $15,000,000.00 in civil payment, represents the largest payment ever levied in an immigration
case.”).
172. Alicia A. Caldwell, Pennsylvania Company to Pay Record Fine for Illegally Hiring Immigrants, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2017, 3:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pennsylvania-company-to-pay-record-fine-forillegally-hiring-immigrants-1506713490 [https://perma.cc/BYZ8-NGLY]
173. Id.
174. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just. S.D. Tex., Waste Management to Forfeit $5.5 Million for Hiring
Illegal Aliens (Aug. 29, 2018), supra note 168
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Civil Corporate Immigration Enforcement

These trends regarding criminal enforcement do not include separate civil
and administrative enforcement against corporations, however, and it would be
possible for criminal enforcement to lag, but for parallel civil and administrative
enforcement to increase. ICE reports that while workplace raids have increased
dramatically, convictions of managers had remained constant.178 ICE also reports, however, that I-9 audits, inspections which are directed at employers, have
increased under the Trump Administration.179
Civil settlements and penalties imposed on corporations, however, have apparently followed a similar trendline as criminal immigration penalties. Civil immigration penalties declined in 2018, with civil penalties at $10.2 million,
slightly higher than the year before, but fines, forfeitures and restitution down to
$10.2 million from $96.7 million (a high figure due to the large fine in the
Asplundh case, noted above, also a legacy case from the Obama Administration).180 These figures highlight that far larger civil penalties are paid each year
than criminal in the immigration setting. There continue to be large civil settlements, without a criminal filing.181 These data also suggest, however, that civil
penalties may have also declined following the rise during the George W. Bush
and then the Obama Administrations.182
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL LAW
One set of implications of these findings shed light on corporate crimmigration as a phenomenon and the trends in corporate immigration prosecutions.
Thus, these data suggest that corporate immigration prosecutions have followed
a similar path in recent years as in other areas in which the Department of Justice
has widened the gap between more lenient corporate enforcement and largerscale individual enforcement. Such a strategy should be particularly visible in

178. Roy Maurer, Immigration Worksite Enforcement Surged in 2018, SHRM (Dec. 20, 2018), https://
www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/ice-immigration-worksite-enforcementsurged-2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/R79U-FJPQ] (“Criminal indictments and convictions remained steady. In FY
2018, 72 managers were indicted, compared to 71 the year before, and 49 managers were convicted versus 55 in
FY 2017. But those numbers are expected to rise due to many ongoing investigations still in development, according to ICE.”).
179. Id.
180. Id. (“ICE opened 6,848 worksite investigations in FY 2018, which ended Sept. 30, compared to 1,691
in the previous 12 months, and it initiated 5,981 I-9 audits, compared to 1,360 in FY 2017. Over 2,300 people
were arrested at work in FY 2018―more than seven times the amount in the previous year.”).
181. See, for example, the settlement with the Seaboard corporation, involving a $1,006,000 civil fine, Oklahoma Based Agri-Business Agrees to $1 Million Civil Settlement, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Nov. 7,
2018),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/oklahoma-based-agri-business-agrees-1-million-civil-settlement
[https://perma.cc/89KR-W2RV], or the settlement with Mu Sigma, in which there was a $1,600,000 civil settlement accompanied by a smaller $900,000 criminal fine, Indian Management Consulting Firm Agrees to $2.5
Million Global Settlement in North Texas for Visa Fraud, Inducing Aliens to Enter US, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENF’T (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/indian-management-consulting-firm-agrees-25-million-global-settlement-north-texas [https://perma.cc/6AK2-EULE].
182. See Appendix.
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the immigration context, given the massive numbers of individuals being prosecuted for immigration crimes, and the relatively insignificant numbers of corporations now being prosecuted for related crimes. Part III focused on the descriptive: setting out an empirical account of these data on corporate immigration
prosecutions. This Part turns towards the implications of these findings for policy
and practice, as well as reflecting on the role that corporate immigration crime
should play in our understanding of immigration and labor law.
One lens from which to view these findings focuses more squarely on immigration law. Immigration enforcement in workplace settings is far less common than enforcement through local arrests and jail screening.183 Immigration
enforcement had only recently become more of a priority in the corporate setting,
as workplace raids became more common and the E-Verify system was adopted,
before apparently slipping in its use.184 The new screening system imposes burdens on individuals, and it imposes compliance burdens on corporations. 185
Whether the system accomplishes its goals in immigration law, is an important
question and it has been developed in literature on E-Verify.186 A second lens is
labor law. Whether the screening system burdens workers’ rights and discourages reporting of unlawful labor and immigration practices is an important question.
A third lens focuses on corporate criminal law. Corporate crime has not
been a field that has been connected to immigration law, even as criminal law
and immigration are now understood to be deeply connected. One way to view
this pattern is a focus by prosecutors on lower-level individual cases, minor
cases, but neglecting the more serious violators, and indeed, not relying on lowerlevel violators to secure cases against more serious violators. Indeed, the focus
on individual immigration prosecutions may come at the expense of holding corporations accountable for immigration violations. Perhaps the disconnect should
not be a surprise; comments by Department of Justice spokesperson comments
suggest that immigration is a top priority under the Trump Administration, while
corporate enforcement is not.187
One rationale for prosecuting corporate immigration violations is a demand-side focus on discouraging migrants overseas. The April 2009 Worksite
Enforcement Strategy emphasized that immigration enforcement must focus on
the demand-side: employers willing to hire illegal employees, for economic
gain.188 Thus, that new ICE approach emphasized that an “effective strategy”
must: (1) penalize employers who “knowingly hire illegal workers,” (2) deter

183. See supra Section II.A, supra (discussing workplace enforcement); U.S IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
supra note 68 (discussing enforcement through local arrests).
184. See supra Section II.C (discussing the use of E-Verify in workplace enforcement); see also Maurer,
supra note 178.
185. See supra Section II.C.
186. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
187. Garrett, supra note 13, at 113–14, 137 (“[S]mall offender cases, though, may have crowded out efforts
to tackle serious corporate offenders in complex individual and corporate cases.”).
188. Memorandum, supra note 111, at 1.
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employers “tempted” to do so, and (3) “encourage all employers to take advantage of well-crafted compliance tools.”189 In doing so, ICE focuses on corporate compliance. Such an approach fits well with corporate enforcement approaches more generally, in which the goal is not just to punish individuals, but
to hold organizations accountable, to promote compliance, and using civil investigations and fines where possible.190 Yet, the evidence gathered here suggests
that the corporate accountability side has been neglected in recent years, and instead the focus is on punishing individuals. Doing so suggests that the demandside approach is no longer a priority.
Another way in which corporate immigration enforcement resembles other
areas of corporate enforcement is that collateral consequences matter.191 Collateral consequences are a key consideration for corporations charged with immigration offenses.192 Collateral consequences may be a consideration for individuals, in the context in which state criminal charges may or may not lead to
immigration or other important consequences.193 By contrast, under the federal
system since 2005, an automatic criminal referral policy was instituted for immigration offenses.194 Any additional collateral consequences of the added criminal charge are intended, and required, on a blanket basis against all individuals. 195 Thus, ICE notes: “ICE removed more than 5,700 aliens identified as
family unit members, which represents a 110% increase in removal of family
unit members compared to FY 2018.”196 Workplace raids, of course, also lead to
separation of families, when noncitizens are detained.197
The argument here is not that workplace raids should be a priority as compared to border enforcement; no claim is being made regarding where or how
immigration enforcement should be prioritized. Nor is the goal to suggest that
criminal prosecution for immigration offenses is necessary and should be increased; relying less on criminal tools may be very much warranted.
Instead, I argue that the disconnect between corporate and individual prosecution has real civil rights and labor consequences. As noted, the workplaces
and companies that have been prosecuted are not white-collar offices with highly

189. Id. at 1.
190. See supra Section II.B (discussing the changes to corporate prosecution in the last two decades).
191. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. See generally About: The National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL
OF ST. GOV’TS, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/3B5T-HMWX]; Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 126–27 (2011); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO . L.J. 1197
(2016); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, Silence
and Misinformation in the Guilty Plea Process, 95 I OWA L. REV . 119, 124 (2009).
194. Securing the Border, supra note 43.
195. See id.
196. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 6.
197. Angela Fritz & Luis Velarde, ICE Arrested Hundreds of People in Raids. Now ‘Devastated’ Children
Are Without Their Parents, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/
2019/08/08/ice-arrested-hundreds-people-raids-now-devastated-children-are-without-their-parents/
[https://perma.cc/K2YU-BQQH].

GARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2]

3/29/2021 8:06 PM

CORPORATE CRIMMIGRATION

387

paid workers who have significant negotiating power.198 As Stephen Lee has observed, “unencumbered by the fear of being punished, employers can threaten to
report workers for removal, whereas workers do not possess any similar ability
to blow the whistle on employers.”199 Or as Michael Wishnie has noted, “a lawbreaking employer may invoke the formidable powers of the government’s law
enforcement apparatus to terrorize its workers and suppress worker dissent under
threat of deportation.”200 Indeed, federal courts have noted as much, when employees have brought discrimination suits; the Ninth Circuit noted, for example,
that by immigration screening, employers could “raise implicitly the threat of
deportation and criminal prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal practices.”201
The criminalization of immigration law has heightened those concerns;
workers can fear both deportation and criminal prosecution, while the employer
may increasingly go unpenalized criminally. Indeed, the IRCA not only created
federal obligations to screen for immigration status, but it also preempted any
state law consequences, civil or criminal, for employers.202 The Postville raids
also provide a further example of this problem, where although the employer was
eventually prosecuted, abusive employment practices persisted for years because
employees were told that “they were going to call immigration if we complained.”203 Thus, as Stephen Lee has argued, it might be far more protective of
employee rights for labor agencies to be involved in policing these workplaces,
rather than immigration screening being the primary vehicle for regulation.204
At the very least, clear policies could be put into place to reward with leniency or as whistleblowers, employees who report illegal employment practices.205 While it is beyond the scope of this Article, and excellent research and
policy has analyzed the tension between immigration enforcement and worker’s
rights, the goal here is to describe how the competing interests in immigration
198. See supra Section III.A.
199. Lee, supra note 17, at 1106.
200. Wishnie, supra note 96, at 216.
201. Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). For extensive citation to cases in which
employers reported employees to immigration authorities only when they attempted to recover unpaid wages,
see Lee, supra note 30, at 1121 n.61.
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“The provisions of [IRCA] preempt any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for
a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”).
203. Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/us/27immig.html [https://perma.cc/D494-B5UQ].
204. Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (2011) (“First,
why has the Department of Labor, our nation’s top labor enforcement agency, struggled to protect unauthorized
workers against exploitive practices despite the scope and seriousness of the problem? And second why has ICE,
our nation’s top immigration enforcement agency, resisted taking into account the labor consequences of their
actions?”).
205. For example, victims of trafficking can receive temporary visas to permit them to cooperate in prosecutions. These are temporary visas, created under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, which
provide to the victims of certain crimes in exchange for help prosecuting the perpetrator. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §1513(a)(2)(B), 114 Stat. 1534 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101). Further, informants are generally rewarded as cooperating witnesses in a wide
variety of federal criminal matters, including corporate cases. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 14, at 247.
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and labor policy are not improved by the addition of federal prosecutors.206 Instead, criminal prosecutions have heightened the imbalance of power between
employer and employee, corporation and individual.
An additional goal here is to describe an imbalance in resources and priorities. The trends can be summarized by noting how resources have been powerfully directed for prosecutions of individual for immigration offenses, whether
at the border or in interior enforcement, but not towards corporate offenses, even
where corporate offenders may violate the law on a greater scale. Thus, the
Southern District of Texas recently received thirty-five new Assistant U.S. Attorney positions to increase prosecutions of “improper entry, illegal reentry and
alien smuggling cases,” all involving individual immigration prosecutions, and
not corporate immigration cases.207 Such policies do not exist in other federal
criminal areas, but again, these policies seem to apply to noncitizens and not to
employees and supervisors at employers that violate immigration laws.
That said, it is also possible that priorities will change over time, or that
new corporate immigration cases in progress will eventually shift these observed
corporate criminal enforcement patterns. In response to the Washington Post
story reporting preliminary data from this study, the Administration stated that,
“Oftentimes, those audits and inspections are the beginning of a lengthy process
that could potentially lead to criminal charges, if sufficient evidence of criminal
activity is discovered.”208 For now, those cases have not appeared in the pipeline,
as cases from the prior Administration have been resolved.209 It appears that both
civil and criminal enforcement have declined.210 Further, it would be consistent
with the Administration’s approach in corporate prosecutions generally if audits
and inspections did not tend to result in corporate referrals or prosecutions for
corporations.211
There is nothing resembling a zero-tolerance policy for corporate immigration violators, in immigration cases, or in any other of federal criminal law. Detailed leniency policies, set out in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual and revised over
two decades, now apply to corporations.212 No such considerations apply to any
group of individuals, and certainly not in the area of immigration enforcement,
where one might instead expect that real value could arise from rewarding with
leniency and protection, the employees who report illegal employment practices.
Thus, one goal in examining corporate immigration prosecutions is to illustrate
206. See Lee supra note 204, at 1093 n.14 (“Similar questions concerning mission orientation, enforcement
discretion, and unauthorized migration could be posed of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.”); id. at 1133 n.174 (“It is
worth noting that a second and related monitoring challenge grows out of the increase in federal prosecutions of
immigration crimes.”); see also Rebecca Smith, Ana Ana Avendaño, Julia Martí
nez Ortega, Iced Out: How Immigration Enforcement Has Interfered With Workers’ Rights, AFL-CIO, 15–28 (2009).
207. Press Release, Department of Justice, AG Sessions Selects SDTX to Receive Additional Resources to
Combat the Southwest Border Crisis (May 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/ag-sessions-selectssdtx-receive-additional-resources-combat-southwest-border-crisis [https://perma.cc/9Q5H-XDNV].
208. Merle, supra note 9.
209. See Appendix.
210. See Appendix.
211. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.
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the glaring mismatch and collision of systems, priorities and federal agencies, in
the use of policies adapted for the largest corporations, in a context in which the
largest populations of individuals are subjected to federal criminal enforcement
by U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Department of Justice, as well as civil immigration consequences, by ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. No
matter what one’s preferred view of either immigration, labor policy, or corporate enforcement, the goals of none of those systems seems well accomplished
by these conflicted approaches.
V. CONCLUSION
While immigration law and criminal law have become intertwined, and a
field of “crimmigration” law now explores that intersection, corporate crime has
not been connected to immigration law in workplaces. Corporate crimmigration
should matter, as policy shifts and enforcement patterns have altered the relationship between corporations, employers, managers, and workers. At the same
time as the tensions between labor and immigration policies have sharpened, the
federal policy and practice of prosecuting individuals for immigration crimes
(largely regarding illegal entry and reentry at the border) could not be more different than the policies concerning interior enforcement, and within that category
of enforcement (which largely relies on state and local criminal arrests to identify
individuals), the practices concerning prosecutions of corporations are quite distinct. The story of corporate immigration prosecution is a recent story, accompanying the rise of E-Verify and employer verification requirements, but the
changes described have also occurred during a time of deep change in both immigration policy and corporate prosecution policy.
The goal of this Article is to provide a different look at what has changed,
by focusing on the prosecution of corporations for the most serious, criminal,
immigration violations. Doing so sheds light on the complex and changing priorities in both our immigration and criminal enforcement systems. During the
same time period, in the past two decades, immigration law has become deeply
connected to criminal enforcement. As Juliet Stumpf observed, as “criminal
sanctions for immigration-related conduct and criminal grounds for removal
from the United States continue to expand, aliens become synonymous with
criminals.”213 Yet, while immigration enforcement has become far more punitive
and prosecution-focused, at the border and also in the interior, the same has not
been true for employers, even when they do commit criminal immigration violations. Just as corporations cannot be jailed, they cannot be deported or expelled.
But they can be subject to fines and other penalties. For a time, the Department
of Justice did focus on corporate enforcement, particularly on the heels of the
launch of the E-Verify system, when compliance combined with the protection
of worker rights seemed to at least be a goal, if not the practice. More recently,
that trend reversed, as documented in this Article. As cases and penalties decline
213. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 A M. U. L.
R EV . 367, 419 (2006).
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for corporations for employer-side immigration violations, the prosecutions for
individuals reached record levels, and workplace raids persist.
Taking as a starting place that criminal enforcement of immigration laws is
currently pursued, this Article describes the complex set of policies and practices
that have resulted. The goals of immigration enforcement, its effects on human
and labor rights, and immigration enforcement harnessed to criminal enforcement, including the prosecution of corporations, each remain in conflict. To the
extent that the Department of Justice is involved in immigration prosecutions,
the Department should aim to correct the imbalance as between corporations and
individuals. It is a basic precept of white-collar enforcement that individuals who
cooperate and bring criminal lawbreaking to light should be rewarded, including
through leniency, and not higher-ups or corporations who themselves violated
the law. If workplace enforcement is to be a priority, a criminal law perspective
also suggests that focusing on large-scale and serious violators should be the focus of enforcement resources, not en masse and “zero tolerance” prosecutions in
minor cases.
The gap between individual and corporation enforcement also highlights
the selective concern with collateral consequences in federal criminal practice. It
is ironic that corporations benefit from great solicitude regarding the potential
collateral consequences of a conviction, while individuals, who directly suffer
such consequences, as defendants or family members of those charged, do not
benefit from any such systemic policy consideration, even if they serve as the
whistleblowers for unlawful labor or immigration practices. Indeed, the larger
effort to regulate workplace screening raises concerns with collateral consequences on employees. Most industries in which immigration-related prosecutions have been brought do not involve white-collar employees or highly paid
occupations. The use of criminal enforcement in policing those industries raises
further questions regarding the goals of the immigration strategy, for which criminal prosecutions are intended to provide an added deterrent and punishment, in
relatively less-privileged workplaces. The dynamic of corporate immigration
prosecutions provides another example of the way in which federal prosecutors
conduct large scale enforcement against individuals, but largely decline to pursue
corporate targets. The problem of “corporate crimmigration” should be critically
examined and addressed, particularly where the goals of immigration, criminal
law, and corporate criminal law diverge and collide as never before.
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APPENDIX: FEDERAL CORPORATE IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS,
2001–2019
Company

GSHC Corp.
Construction
Personnel, Inc.

Disposition

plea
plea

Oriental Buffet,
Inc.

plea

Global Staffing
Services, Inc.

plea

Janitorial
Maintenance, Inc.
Clark's Quality
Roofing, Inc.
East Bernstadt
Cooperage, Inc.
CMS of
Queensbury, Inc.

plea
plea
plea
plea

Trussway Ltd.

plea

E. L. Thompson
Associates, LLC

plea

Forest Hill, Inc.

plea

Bavarian Inn, Inc.

plea

3D Poultry
Loading, Inc.
IMC Associates,
Inc.
Allied Floor Care
Service, Inc.
Champion Floor
Care Associates,
Inc.
Cleanmax
Associates, Inc.
Comet Floor
Case Associates,
Inc.

plea
plea
plea

Jurisdiction
California Northern
District
Tennessee Eastern District
Pennsylvania Western
District
Georgia Northern
District
Georgia Northern
District
Colorado
Kentucky Eastern District
Pennsylvania Middle District
Kentucky Western
District
Tennessee Western
District
Arkansas Western
District
Arkansas Western
District
Arkansas Western
District
Pennsylvania Middle District
Pennsylvania Middle District

plea

Pennsylvania Middle District
Pennsylvania Middle District

plea

Pennsylvania Middle District

plea

Total
Penalty

Date

84,000

1/17/01

0

9/19/01

10,000

12/18/01

57,000

7/30/02

24,000

7/30/02

40,000

10/11/02

40,000

3/28/03

10,000

6/4/03

0

6/5/03

27,000

12/22/03

10,000

3/15/04

3,000

10/13/04

24,000

1/25/05

4,000,000

4/25/05

0

4/25/05

0

4/25/05

0

4/25/05

0

4/25/05
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Express
Corporate
Services, Inc.
Florida Floor
Care, Inc.
Ironman Maintenance Associates,
Inc.
Mercury Floor
Care Associates,
Inc.
National Cleaning Management,
Inc.
Precision
Cleaning, Inc.
World Clean
Associates, Inc.
Boeing Tile and
Marble, Inc.
DJR Cleaning
Enterprises, Inc.
Julie's Cafe
China Star, Inc.
White Dairy Ice
Cream Co., Inc.
PJ Services, LLC
Allison Creek
Sheep Co.
Carlson
Livestock Co.
WesternGeco,
LLC (subsidiary
of Schlumberger
Seismic, Inc.)
Asha Ventures,
LLC

[Vol. 2021

plea

Pennsylvania Middle District
Pennsylvania Middle District

plea

Pennsylvania Middle District

0

4/25/05

plea

Pennsylvania Middle District

0

4/25/05

0

4/25/05

0

4/25/05

0

4/25/05

0

7/1/05

500,000

10/17/05

20,000
55,000

10/17/05
11/14/05

1,000
150,000

1/9/06
3/22/06

plea

0

4/25/05

0

4/25/05

plea
plea

Pennsylvania Middle District
Pennsylvania Middle District
Pennsylvania Middle District
Florida Middle District
Pennsylvania Middle District
Wisconsin Eastern District
New Mexico
Arkansas Western
District
Kansas

plea

Idaho

26,000

5/18/06

plea

Idaho

26,000

5/18/06

19,600,000

6/1/06

75,000

10/24/06

75,000

10/24/06

Kansas
Florida Middle District

175,000

11/21/06

500

11/30/06

North Dakota
Ohio - Southern District
Ohio - Southern District

1,581,072

12/6/06

0

3/2/07

0

3/2/07

plea
plea
plea
plea
plea
plea
plea

DP
plea

Narayan, LLC
Bob Eisel Powder
Coatings, Inc.
Jax China Kings,
Inc.
Stucco Design,
Inc.

plea

Garcia Labor Co.
Garcia Labor Co.
of Ohio, Inc.

plea

plea
plea
plea

plea

Texas - Southern District
Kentucky Eastern District
Kentucky Eastern District
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Yu Hua Co. LLC

plea

Fenceworks, Inc.
Plastrglas, Inc.

plea
plea

HV Connect, Inc.
Alexandria
Employment
Agency

plea

Jackson Country
Club
Lochirco Fruit
and Produce, Inc.

4/3/07
4/3/07

0

11/13/07

0

12/10/07

214,500

2/6/08

99,000

2/7/08

48,000
10,000

3/19/08
4/30/08

250,000

5/5/08

100,000

6/25/08

0

7/22/08

Nevada

1,000,000

8/8/08

plea

Maryland
Texas - Southern District
Louisiana Eastern District
Mississippi Northern
District
New York Northern
District

50,000

9/26/08

3,000,000

10/1/08

759,071

10/2/08

310,512

10/20/08

20,697,317

12/19/08

Massachusetts
Florida Northern
District

1,970,000

1/28/09

36,000

2/13/09

South Dakota
Indiana Northern
District

45,000

2/26/09

210,000

4/23/09

plea

Car Care
Spectrum
Interiors, Inc.
Mack Associates,
Inc.
ZHU & Partners,
LLC
Republic
Services, Inc.
N&F Logistic,
Inc.

plea

Janco
Composites, Inc.

4,700,000
96,000

plea

plea

Peabody Corp.

Alrek Business
Solutions, Inc.
Dakota Beef,
LLC

3/6/07

plea

DP

plea
plea

IFCO Systems
Michael Bianco,
Inc.

45,000

Ohio - Northern District
Mississippi Southern
District
Missouri Eastern District
Kentucky Western
District
Hawaii
Virginia - Eastern District
Pennsylvania Eastern District
Kentucky Eastern District

plea

Hedges Landscape Specialists
Tenryoan, Inc.

Tarrasco Steel
Company, Inc.

Arkansas Western
District
California Southern
District
Nebraska
Ohio - Northern District

393

NP
plea

plea

NP
plea

plea
plea

plea
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Acambaro
Mexican Restaurant, Inc.
Garcia's
Distributor, Inc.
Garibaldi
Mexican
Restaurant, Inc.
Asiana
Pewaukee, Inc.
T&J
Restaurants, LLC
Shipley
Properties
Shipley Do-Nut
Flour and Supply
Co., Inc.
Colmenares
Rodriguez, Inc.
Columbia Farms,
Inc.
Mt. Fuji Restaurants, Inc.
CCGWA LLC
Flowood
Partners, LLC
Pilgrim's Pride,
Inc.
Wedekemper's
Construction, Inc.
Wedekemper's,
Inc.
Hi Tech
Trucking, Inc.
FC Young & Co.
Disabatino Landscaping and Tree
Service, Inc.
Village Green
Landscaping
Howard
Industries, Inc.
BMR Development, LLC

[Vol. 2021

dismissal

Arkansas Western
District
Arkansas Western
District
Arkansas Western
District
Wisconsin Eastern District
Missouri Eastern District
Texas - Southern District

plea

Texas - Southern District

250,000

8/12/09

plea

Nebraska

0

10/15/09

DP

South Carolina
Mississippi Southern
District
North Dakota
Mississippi Southern
District
Texas - Eastern
District
Illinois Southern
District
Illinois Southern
District
Virginia - Eastern District
Pennsylvania Eastern District

1,500,000

11/3/09

0
40,000

12/1/09
12/15/09

0

12/17/09

4,500,000

12/30/09

2,500

4/29/10

2,500

4/29/10

100,000

11/24/10

69,000

2/4/11

51,000

2/28/11

24,000

2/28/11

2,500,000

3/4/11

51,000

3/7/11

plea

plea

plea
plea
plea

plea
plea

plea
NP

plea

plea
plea
plea

plea
plea

plea
plea

Pennsylvania Eastern District
Pennsylvania Eastern District
Mississippi Southern
District
Pennsylvania Eastern District

250,000

4/30/09

20,000

4/30/09

25,000

4/30/09

32,000

5/18/09

150,000

5/29/09

0

8/7/09
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Landscaping
Radley Run
Country Club,
Inc.
Birker, Inc.
All Around
Landscaping, Inc.
Arizona Trailer
Manufacturing,
Inc.
Eurofresh, Inc.
YCL Corp.
Aquila Farms,
LLC
Advanced
Containment
Systems, Inc.
Atrium
Companies, Inc.
Ayala's Family
Bakery, Inc.

Herbco Int'l, Inc.
ABC Professional
Tree Services,
Inc.
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plea

plea
plea

plea

plea
plea
plea
plea

NP
NP

plea

plea

NP

Love Irrigation,
Inc.

DP

Behrmann Meat
Processing, Inc.

plea

Behrmann Yorkshire Farms
Brake Landscaping & Lawncare,
Inc.
Vector
Fabrication, Inc.
Diversified Concrete, LLC
McCalla Corp.
Fei Teng, Inc.

plea

plea

plea
plea
plea
plea

Pennsylvania Eastern District
Pennsylvania Eastern District
Iowa - Northern District
Arkansas Western
District

Arizona
Arizona
Texas - Western District
Michigan Eastern District
Texas - Southern District
Texas - Southern District
Arkansas Western
District
Washington Western
District
Texas - Southern District
Mississippi Southern
District
Illinois Southern
District
Illinois Southern
District
Missouri Eastern District
California Northern
District
Louisiana Eastern District
Kansas
Virginia - Eastern District

395

129,000

3/7/11

27,000

3/7/11

32,000

4/25/11

40,000

7/7/11

15,000
0

7/13/11
8/30/11

5,000

10/27/11

500,000

11/18/11

2,000,000

1/1/12

2,000,000

1/1/12

157,165

3/28/12

1,000,000

5/1/12

2,000,000

5/18/12

515,110

5/22/12

55,000

7/2/12

55,000

7/2/12

0

9/13/12

75,000

10/12/12

18,449
300,000

10/31/12
12/4/12

0

2/25/13
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Wazana Brothers
International, Inc.
Concrete
Management
Corp.
TN Job Service,
Inc.

plea

55,000

3/13/13

176,500

4/25/13

0

4/30/13

0

12/27/13

125,000

12/30/13

plea

Colorado
Ohio - Northern District
Mississippi Northern
District
Louisiana Eastern District
Louisiana Eastern District

125,000

12/30/13

plea

Colorado

0

2/3/14

plea

170,000

3/21/14

25,000

4/10/14

plea

Indiana
Pennsylvania Eastern District
North Carolina- Middle
District

0

11/3/14

plea
plea

Kansas
Arizona

582,601
50

11/19/14
11/21/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/21/14

plea

Arizona

0

11/21/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/21/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/21/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/21/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/21/14

plea
plea

Arizona
Arizona

50
50

11/24/14
11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea
dismissal

A-1 Homes, LLC
Vacco Marine,
Inc.
Willco of Houma,
Inc.
Premier Paving,
Inc.
NH Environmental Group, Inc.

plea

C.M. Jones, Inc.

plea

Triangle Grading
and Paving, Inc.
INEK
Technologies,
LLC
3rd & Bell, LLC
Danny's San Tan,
LLC
National Car
Care Development Co.
Paradise Village
Car Care Center,
Inc.
Twentieth &
Highland, LLC
Danny's Family
Companies, LLC
Danny's Family
Carousel, Inc.
83rd & Union
Hills, LLC
84th & Bell, LLC
Danny's Crossroads, LLC
Danny's Happy
Valley, Inc.
Danny's Management Services,
LLC

California Central District
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plea
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No. 2]
Danny's Raintree
& Northsight,
LLC
Danny's Scottsdale & TB
Danny's Tatum,
LLC
Danny's Tempe,
LLC
Danny's Family,
LP
Danny's Family
Companies II,
LLC
CORTEC Precision Sheet Metal,
Inc.
Osaka Thai Corp.
Shinto Restaurant, Inc.
Glenview Dairy,
LLC
Valley View
Building Services, LLC
Ros's Cabinets II,
Inc.
Programmer Resources International, Inc.
HW Group, LLC
Kearney Hospitality, INC.
L.A. Jumbo
China Buffet, Inc.
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plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

plea

Arizona

50

11/24/14

48,000

12/10/14

0

12/10/14

0

12/10/14

60,000

5/6/15

0

6/19/15

50,000

6/25/15

100,000
1,000,000

8/13/15
3/28/16

150,000

5/11/16

0

5/19/16

75,000

6/2/16

20,000

7/1/16

1,500,000

7/15/16

1,000,000

8/11/17

95,000,000

9/28/17

plea
plea
plea

plea

plea

Texas - Western District
Louisiana Eastern District
Louisiana Eastern District
New York Western
District

plea

Arizona
Michigan Eastern District

plea
plea

Missouri Eastern District
South Carolina

plea
plea

DJ Drywall, Inc.

plea

Servi-Tek, Inc.
Mary's Gone
Crackers, Inc.

plea

La Espiga De Oro

plea

Asplundh Tree
Experts, Co.

plea

NP

Nebraska
Louisiana Eastern District
Washington Western
District
California Southern
District
California Eastern District
Texas - Southern District
Pennsylvania Western
District
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Clarke's Landscaping &
Lawncare, Inc.
Waste Management of Texas
Wright State University
Lin's China Buffet of Meridian,
Inc.

plea
NP
NP

plea

Pennsylvania Eastern District
Texas - Southern District
Ohio - Southern District
Mississippi Southern
District
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151,200

10/13/17

5,500,000

8/29/18

1,000,000

11/16/18

0

4/26/19

